Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis Signaling Game

Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1068-1079 (2017)
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Abstract

We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this article can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict-of-interest signaling games.

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Author Profiles

Justin Bruner
University of Arizona
Carl Brusse
University of Sydney

Citations of this work

Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):19-43.
Modelling Religious Signalling.Carl Brusse - 2019 - Dissertation, Australian National University

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature.Peter Godfrey-Smith (ed.) - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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