Neuroethics 7 (2):159-172 (2014)

Authors
Regina Rini
York University
Abstract
Neuromoral theorists are those who claim that a scientific understanding of moral judgment through the methods of psychology, neuroscience and related disciplines can have normative implications and can be used to improve the human ability to make moral judgments. We consider three neuromoral theories: one suggested by Gazzaniga, one put forward by Gigerenzer, and one developed by Greene. By contrasting these theories we reveal some of the fundamental issues that neuromoral theories in general have to address. One important issue concerns whether the normative claims that neuromoral theorists would like to make are to be understood in moral terms or in non-moral terms. We argue that, on either a moral or a non-moral interpretation of these claims, neuromoral theories face serious problems. Therefore, neither the moral nor the non-moral reading of the normative claims makes them philosophically viable
Keywords Morality  Normativity  Ethics  Neuroscience  Psychology
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DOI 10.1007/s12152-013-9191-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1871 - Thoemmes Press.
Critique of Practical Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1788 - Hackett Publishing Company.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Normative Moral Neuroscience: The Third Tradition of Neuroethics.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):411-431.

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