Abstract

In this dissertation I give a metaethical account of human agency by developing the notion of character and showing its relation to agency. I argue that subjectivity, defined in terms of character, is ineliminable with regard to moral deliberation and that human agency is essentially personal. Agency is personal, in that, agents act from the standpoint of their character--the standpoint of their internalized conception of value. ;I then delineate the problem this account of agency poses for certain types of objective moral theories when they are applied at the level of the individual who has a character: theories which either require or permit agents to act from an impersonal standpoint by requiring or permitting agents to act either contrary to or apart from their character. By requiring or permitting agents to act from an impersonal standpoint, a necessary condition of agency is threatened. The problem points to the fundamental assumption these theories have regarding moral agency: the assumption that agency is impersonal and that what agents ought to do has nothing to do with their internalized conception of value. ;Finally, I discuss the implication this account of agency has for normative ethics and argue that an adequate theory is one that reflects this account and does not require or permit agents to act from an impersonal standpoint, that is, to act either contrary to or apart from their character. The type of theory that would reflect this account is a character development theory. This type of theory is conceptually different from the moral theories discussed in this dissertation. The difference has to do with its fundamental assumption regarding moral agency: the assumption that agency is personal and that what agents ought to do has to do with their internalized conception of value. The purpose of a character development theory is to tell us what values constitute a good character and how these values are to be internalized