Kai Michael Buttner
Universidad del Norte
By defining God as a maximally great being Plantinga is able to devise an ontological argument which validly infers from the possibility of there being a God that there necessarily is a God. In this article I shall argue that Plantinga’s argument is not only question-begging, as several critics have complained, but circular in the strongest sense of the term. Based on reflections on the relation between the notions of coherence and possibility, I shall defend two arguments, previously proposed by Tooley and Guleserian, against the existence of a maximally great being. The article concludes with some critical remarks on Plantinga’s rationale for conceiving God as such a being.
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-021-09810-1
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The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2020 - Think 19 (55):11-21.

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