Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency

Theoria 77 (4):312-332 (2011)
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In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am interested in the implications for thinking about the variety of evaluative control we can exercise over the formation of our doxastic attitudes. I show that our assumptions about how to individuate actions matters for how we think about doxastic agency and, hence, the conclusions we reach about action-individuation are of greater significance than some have thought



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Andrei Buckareff
Marist College

Citations of this work

Basic Actions Reloaded.Santiago Amaya - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (9):e12435.
De Se Content and Action Generalisation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):315-344.
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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.

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