Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency

Theoria 77 (4):312-332 (2011)
In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am interested in the implications for thinking about the variety of evaluative control we can exercise over the formation of our doxastic attitudes. I show that our assumptions about how to individuate actions matters for how we think about doxastic agency and, hence, the conclusions we reach about action-individuation are of greater significance than some have thought
Keywords doxastic voluntarism  action‐individuation  mental agency  agency  mental action  doxastic agency  action  belief
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01113.x
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References found in this work BETA
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.
Motivation and Agency.R. Mele Alfred - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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