Belief about Probability

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.

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Author Profiles

Ray Buchanan
University of Texas at Austin
Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo, The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Representing relevance.Robert Hartzell - 2025 - Synthese 205 (3):1-18.
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.

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References found in this work

Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
The realm of reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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