Compatibilism and doxastic control

Philosophia 34 (2):143-152 (2006)
Abstract
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
Keywords doxastic voluntarism  belief  agency  action theory  epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9013-0
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References found in this work BETA
Evidentialism.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
Intending and Acting.Myles Brand - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):261-264.

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