Philosophia 34 (2):143-152 (2006)
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
|Keywords||doxastic voluntarism belief agency action theory epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.R. Mele Alfred - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation.Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 77--92.
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