Compatibilism and doxastic control

Philosophia 34 (2):143-152 (2006)
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Abstract

Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.

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Andrei Buckareff
Marist College

Citations of this work

Action and Doxastic Control: The Asymmetry Thesis Revisited.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):5-12.

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References found in this work

On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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