Doxastic decisions and controlling belief

Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114 (2006)
Abstract
I critique Matthias Steup’s account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steup’s theory of doxastic agency may have for epistemic deontologism
Keywords doxastic voluntarism  doxastic attitudes  action  agency  epistemic deontology  epistemic justification
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-006-1017-7
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References found in this work BETA
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Evidentialism.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
Deontology and Doxastic Control.Nicholas Tebben - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2835-2847.
Taking Aim at the Truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.
Compatibilism and Doxastic Control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.

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