Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114 (2006)
I critique Matthias Steupâs account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steupâs theory of doxastic agency may have for epistemic deontologism
|Keywords||doxastic voluntarism doxastic attitudes action agency epistemic deontology epistemic justification|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.R. Mele Alfred - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Why Doxastic Responsibility is Not Based on Direct Doxastic Control.Andrea Kruse - forthcoming - Synthese:1-32.
Similar books and articles
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
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