Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28 (2013)

Authors
Lara Buchak
Princeton University
Abstract
The ‘rollback argument,’ pioneered by Peter van Inwagen, purports to show that indeterminism in any form is incompatible with free will. The argument has two major premises: the first claims that certain facts about chances obtain in a certain kind of hypothetical situation, and the second that these facts entail that some actual act is not free. Since the publication of the rollback argument, the second claim has been vehemently debated, but everyone seems to have taken the first claim for granted. Nevertheless, the first claim is totally unjustified. Even if we accept the second claim, therefore, the argument gives us no reason to think that free will and indeterminism are incompatible. Furthermore, seeing where the rollback argument goes wrong illuminates how a certain kind of incompatibilist, the ‘chance-incompatibilist,’ ought to think about free will and chance, and points to a possibility for free will that has remained largely unexplored
Keywords free will  determinism  indeterminism  rollback  chance  agency
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00094.x
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References found in this work BETA

What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80.
Why Free Will Remains a Mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.
Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.
The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.
Rolling Back the Rollback Argument.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (39):43-61.
Objective Probabilities of Free Choice.Leigh C. Vicens - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):125-135.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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