Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection

Episteme 11 (4):391-409 (2014)
Abstract
Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands current empirical scrutiny.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/epi.2014.22
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,195
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
How to Be a Fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
Counteractuals, Counterfactuals and Semantic Intuitions.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):35-54.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
Question-Embedding and Factivity.Paul Egré - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):85-125.
How to Forget That 'Know' is Factive.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):449-459.
Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Restricting Factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
The New View on Ignorance Undefeated.Rik Peels - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
Idealizations and Scientific Understanding.Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):237-252.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-02-18

Total downloads

191 ( #22,669 of 2,163,979 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #33,422 of 2,163,979 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums