Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection

Episteme 11 (4):391-409 (2014)

Abstract

Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands current empirical scrutiny.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,855

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-02-18

Downloads
273 (#41,112)

6 months
3 (#197,582)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars (ed.) - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 75 references / Add more references

Similar books and articles

'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
Question-Embedding and Factivity.Paul Egré - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):85-125.
How to Forget That 'Know' is Factive.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):449-459.
Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Restricting Factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
The New View on Ignorance Undefeated.Rik Peels - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
Idealizations and Scientific Understanding.Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):237-252.