In the Thick of Moral Motivation

Abstract
We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we provide evidence that the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology could be a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
Keywords moral motivation  folk psychology  belief  experimental philosophy  metaethics  entailment thesis  verbal dispute
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s13164-016-0306-3
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,204
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics.Ben Fraser - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (6):1-18.
Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.
Internalizm motywacyjny Richarda M. Hare'a.Krzysztof Saja - 2007 - Analiza I Egzystencja 5:179-202.
The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Folk Psychology as a Theory.Ian Ravenscroft - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2014-01-21

Total downloads

132 ( #35,896 of 2,164,236 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #36,361 of 2,164,236 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums