Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language


Authors
Wesley Buckwalter
University of Manchester
Abstract
Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts. Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding ordinary knowledge practices. Proposed is an experiment designed to test the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist defenses rely. In the cases tested, the folk pattern of knowledge attribution runs contrary to what contextualism predicts. While preliminary, these data inspire prima facie skepticism for the contextualist hypothesis regarding folk knowledge claims, as well as challenge certain predictions made by recent theories of subject-sensitive invariantism. It is further argued that such results raise methodological questions concerning the practice of relying on an assumption of intuitions, with respect to ordinary language practices, as evidence for philosophical conclusions regarding knowledge.
Keywords Epistemology  Experimental Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 49,017
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 55 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?By Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232–251.
Gettier Made ESEE.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):368-383.
The Mindreader and the Scientist.Heidi Maibom - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.
Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-06-27

Total views
259 ( #28,010 of 2,310,941 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #350,897 of 2,310,941 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature