Noûs 49 (2):201–234 (2015)
According to a prominent claim in recent epistemology, people are less likely to ascribe knowledge to a high stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are severe, than to a low stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are slight. We offer an opinionated "state of the art" on experimental research about the role of stakes in knowledge judgments. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies--due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May et al (2010), and Buckwalter (2010)--which cast doubt on folk stakes sensitivity, and a second wave of empirical studies--due to Pinillos (2012) and Sripada & Stanley (2012)--said to vindicate it, as well as new studies of our own. We conclude that the balance of evidence to date best supports Folk stakes insensitivity, or that all else equal, stakes do not affect knowledge ascription.
|Keywords||Experimental philosophy Subject-sensitive invariantism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemically Responsible Action.Kenneth Boyd - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):378-410.
Advances in Experimental Epistemology. [REVIEW]Jie Gao - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):101-105.
Similar books and articles
Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
The Mystery of Stakes and Error in Ascriber Intuitions.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Bloomsbury Academic.
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.
Czy wiedza jest zależna od kontekstu? Kontekstualizm a inwariantyzm praktyczny.Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (4).
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.
Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Analysis 65 (286):132–138.
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
High Stakes and Acceptance Behavior in Ultimatum Bargaining.Bertrand Munier & Costin Zaharia - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (3):187-207.
Contrasting Cases.Nat Hansen - 2014 - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 71-95.
Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence.Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.
Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
Added to index2012-08-07
Total downloads599 ( #2,311 of 2,171,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #22,626 of 2,171,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?