Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes

Noûs 49 (2):201–234 (2015)
Abstract
According to a prominent claim in recent epistemology, people are less likely to ascribe knowledge to a high stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are severe, than to a low stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are slight. We offer an opinionated "state of the art" on experimental research about the role of stakes in knowledge judgments. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies--due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May et al (2010), and Buckwalter (2010)--which cast doubt on folk stakes sensitivity, and a second wave of empirical studies--due to Pinillos (2012) and Sripada & Stanley (2012)--said to vindicate it, as well as new studies of our own. We conclude that the balance of evidence to date best supports Folk stakes insensitivity, or that all else equal, stakes do not affect knowledge ascription.
Keywords Experimental philosophy  Subject-sensitive invariantism
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/nous.12017
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition.Wesley Buckwalter - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):378-410.
Knowledge and Availability.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573.
Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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