Physicalism and the problem of mental causation

Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174 (2001)

Abstract
In this paper I argue that the problem of mental causation can be solved by distinguishing between classificatory mental properties, like being a pain, and instances of those properties.Antireductive physicalism allows only that the former be irreducibly mental. Consequently, properties like being a pain cannot have causal commerce with the physical without violating causal closure. But instances of painfulness, according to the token identity thesis, are identical with various physical tokens and can therefore have causal efficacy in the physical world. Since we expect particular mental phenomena, not types or classes of mental phenomena to be involved in causal interactions, it is argued that antireductive physicalism can explain satisfactorily mental causation, despite the protests of Kim, Sosa, Honderich, and others. Being a mental state of a certain sort may have no causal efficacy, but the intentional and phenomenal properties of such states should, if my argument is correct
Keywords Causation  Mental  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Honderich, T  Kim, J  Sosa, E
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2001_25
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