Authors
Ray Buchanan
University of Texas at Austin
Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis’s project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated developments and defenses notwithstanding, we think the core thesis is vulnerable. We pose a dilemma by considering the two sides of a current epistemological controversy over the relation between evidence and rational belief: permissivism vs. uniqueness. As we argue, the prospects for the Lewisian project look dim when either supposition is clearly made.
Keywords reduction of mind  David Lewis  rationality  permissivism  uniqueness
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12858
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References found in this work BETA

Reduction of Mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
Radical Interpretation.David Lewis - 1974 - Synthese 27 (July-August):331-344.
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.
What Are Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation.Luca Barlassina & Robert M. Gordon - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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