The Genuine Attitude View of Fictional Belief

In Bradley H., Sullivan-Bissett E. & Noordhof P. (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford University Press (2017)
Authors
Katie Tullmann
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Wesley Buckwalter
University of Manchester
Abstract
The distinct-attitude view of fictional narratives is a standard position in contemporary aesthetics. This is the view that cognitive attitudes formed in response to fictions are a distinct kind of mental state from beliefs formed in response to non-fictional scenarios, such as pretend or imaginary states. In this paper we argue that the balance of functional, behavioral, and neuroscientific evidence best supports the genuine-attitude view of belief. According to the genuine-attitude view, cognitive responses to fictions are genuine beliefs that are not a distinct kind of mental state from the beliefs that we form in response to non-fictional scenarios. We consider the implications of the genuine-attitude view for debates at the intersection of epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.
Keywords fiction  belief  aesthetics  functionalism  behavior  folk psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,925
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Taking the Fictional Stance.Katherine Tullmann - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (6):766-792.
Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 174-193.
Fictional Emotion, Belief and Imagination.Bijoy Hati Boruah - 1984 - Dissertation, University of Guelph (Canada)
Propositional Attitudes in Fiction.John Zeimbekis - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.
Mental State Attribution for Interactionism.Uku Tooming - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):184-207.
Truth Meets Fiction: The Semantic Psychology of Make-Belief.Richard Mark Hanley - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park
The Product of Self-Deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
Fiction, Emotion and ’Belief’: A Reply to Eva Schaper.Brian Rosebury - 1979 - British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (2):120-130.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-03-14

Total downloads
22 ( #273,605 of 2,272,739 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #109,784 of 2,272,739 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature