Worlds and Propositions Set Free

Erkenntnis (4):1-24 (2013)
Authors
Edward Zalta
Stanford University
Otávio Bueno
University of Miami
Christopher Menzel
Texas A&M University
Abstract
The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worlds. Next the authors show that an object-theoretic analysis of the Kaplan paradox reveals that there is no genuine paradox at all, as the central premise of the paradox is simply a logical falsehood and hence can be rejected on the strongest possible grounds—not only in object theory but for the very framework of propositional modal logic in which Kaplan frames his argument. The authors close by fending off a possible objection that object theory avoids the Russell paradox only by refusing to incorporate set theory and, hence, that the object-theoretic solution is only a consequence of the theory’s weakness
Keywords possible worlds  propositions  object theory  paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9565-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,245
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Logic, Logic, and Logic.George Boolos - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Cambridge University Press.
Formal Philosophy. [REVIEW]Richard Montague - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):573-578.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Explanation and Nowness: An Objection to the A-Theory.Leo Carton Mollica - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2513-2530.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Russell's Paradox of the Totality of Propositions.Nino B. Cocchiarella - 2000 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):25-37.
The Modal Object Calculus and its Interpretation.Edward N. Zalta - 1997 - In M. de Rijke (ed.), Advances in Intensional Logic. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 249--279.
The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory.Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3):1-31.
A Model Theoretic Semantics for Quantum Logic.E. -W. Stachow - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:272 - 280.
Ways Things Can't Be.Greg Restall - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
The Limits of Modality.Sam Cowling - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):473-495.
Sets and Worlds Again.Christopher Menzel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):304-309.
On Fineness of Grain.Jeffrey C. King - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):763-781.
Constructing Worlds.Mark Jago - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):59-74.
Possibilism and Object Theory.Christopher Menzel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):195 - 208.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-11-01

Total downloads
114 ( #50,997 of 2,242,784 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #69,260 of 2,242,784 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature