Minds and Machines 28 (3):491-513 (2018)

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Jeff Buechner
Rutgers University - Newark
Abstract
Kripke’s argument against functionalism extended to physical computers poses a deep philosophical problem for understanding the standard view of what computers are. The problem puts into jeopardy the definition in the standard view that computers are physical machines for performing physical computations. Indeed, it is entirely possible that, unless this philosophical problem is resolved, we will never have a good understanding of computers and may never know just what they are.
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-018-9466-5
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.

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Citations of this work BETA

Syntax, Semantics, and Computer Programs.William J. Rapaport - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (2):309-321.

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