Empiricism, conservativeness, and quasi-truth

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):485 (1999)
A first step is taken towards articulating a constructive empiricist philosophy of mathematics, thus extending van Fraassen's account to this domain. In order to do so, I adapt Field's nominalization program, making it compatible with an empiricist stance. Two changes are introduced: (a) Instead of taking conservativeness as the norm of mathematics, the empiricist countenances the weaker notion of quasi-truth (as formulated by da Costa and French), from which the formal properties of conservativeness are derived; (b) Instead of quantifying over spacetime regions, the empiricist only admits quantification over occupied regions, since this is enough for his or her needs
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DOI 10.1086/392746
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Otavio Bueno (2005). Dirac and the Dispensability of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 36 (3):465-490.
Paul Dicken (2009). Constructive Empiricism and the Vices of Voluntarism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):189 – 201.

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