Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2119-2137 (2019)

Denis Buehler
Institut Jean Nicod
There has recently been much interest in the role of attention in controlling action. The role has been mischaracterized as an element in necessary and sufficient conditions on agential control. In this paper I attempt a new characterization of the role. I argue that we need to understand attentional control in order to fully understand agential control. To fully understand agential control we must understand paradigm exercises of agential control. Three important accounts of agential control—intentional, reflective, and goal-represented control—do not fully explain such exercises. I argue that understanding them requires understanding how deployments of visual attention implement flexible occurrent control, or a capacity to flexibly adjust the degree of control that individuals exercise over their actions. While such deployments of attention are neither necessary nor sufficient for exercising agential control, they constitute an attentional skill for controlling action, understanding which is central to fully understanding agential control. We can appreciate its centrality if we appreciate that this attentional skill for controlling action is plausibly crucial to acting non-negligently.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1118-3
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Oops! I Did It Again: The Psychology of Everyday Action Slips.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (2):282-294.
Attention.Christopher Mole - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Skilled Guidance.Denis Buehler - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):641-667.
Unity in the Scientific Study of Intellectual Attention.Mark Fortney - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):444-459.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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