Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony

Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2005.2.2.129
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Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Relevance.D. Sperber & D. Wilson - 1995 - Blackwell.
Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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