Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2):43-48 (2005)
Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony
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References found in this work BETA
Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):393-411.
Précis of Relevance: Communication and Cognition.Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):697.
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