Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):402 – 412 (2003)
The blame for the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes is often placed on self-reference and circularity. Some years ago, Yablo [1985; 1993] challenged this diagnosis, by producing a paradox that's liar-like but does not seem to involve circularity. But is Yablo's paradox really non-circular? In a recent paper, Beall  has suggested that there are no means available to refer to Yablo's paradox without invoking descriptions, and since Priest  has shown that any such description is circular, Beall concludes that Yablo's paradox itself is circular. In this paper, we argue that Beall's conclusion is unwarranted, given that (1) descriptions are not the only way to refer to Yablo's paradox, and (ii) we have no reason to believe that because the description involves self-reference, the denotation of the description is also circular. As a result, for all that's been said so far, we have no reason to believe that Yablo's paradox is circular
|Keywords||440106 Logic C1 Philosophy Liar Paradox 780199 Other|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Equiparadoxicality of Yablo's Paradox and the Liar.Ming Hsiung - 2013 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):23-31.
Semantic Paradox: A Comparative Analysis of Scholastic and Analytic Views.Miroslav Hanke - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):367-386.
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