A dilemma for the knowledge despite falsehood strategy

Episteme 15 (2):166-182 (2018)
Authors
Christopher Michael Cloos
University of California at Santa Barbara
Christopher Buford
University of Akron
Abstract
One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
Keywords Knowledge From Falsehood  Evidence
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/epi.2016.53
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 37,153
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.
Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.
There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.
When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Andrew Cullison Neil Feit - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 51-70.
Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma.Louis Marinoff - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4):461-472.
Later Wittgenstein and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Scott Scheall - 2011 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):268-286.
Knowledge with and Without Belief.Michael Veber - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.
Religious Knowledge.John Hawthorne - 2007 - Philosophic Exchange 37 (1).
Developing a Knowledge Strategy.Michael H. Zack - 2006 - In Laurence Prusak & Eric Matson (eds.), Knowledge Management and Organizational Learning: A Reader. Oxford University Press.
Epicurus on Truth and Falsehood.Alexander Bown - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):463–503.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-04-24

Total downloads
51 ( #130,757 of 2,308,622 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #13,685 of 2,308,622 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature