Contextualism, Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Journal of Philosophical Research 34:111-121 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper argues that Epistemic Contextualism, Knowledge Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion are inconsistent. The argument is developed by considering an objection to Contextualism that is unsuccessful. Some Contextualist responses are canvassed and rejected. Finally, it is argued that an analogue of the inconsistency arises for those who accept that justification is closed under known entailment.

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Christopher Buford
University of Akron

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