Centering on Demonstrative Thought

Philosophia 41 (4):1135-1147 (2013)
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The nature of perceptual demonstratives, the ‘that F’ component of judgments of the form ‘that F is G’ based on perceptual input, has been a topic of interest for many philosophers. Another related, though distinct, question concerns the nature of demonstrative judgments based not on current perceptual input, but instead derived from memory. I argue that the account put forward by John Campbell fails to adequately account for memory-based demonstrative thought



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Christopher Buford
University of Akron

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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.

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