Effective Skeptical Arguments

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1):55-60 (2015)
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Abstract

_ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 55 - 60 Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem for skeptical arguments: they require the KK principle. We respond to this criticism on behalf of the skeptic in our paper

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Christopher Buford
University of Akron

Citations of this work

Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner.Peter Murphy - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):397-403.

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References found in this work

The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios.Peter Murphy - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):271-281.

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