Knowing Violence: Testimony, Trust and Truth

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 235 (1):277-291 (2006)
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Abstract

How do we know what violence is? And how do we acquire knowledge of violence? The key to these questions can be found in the epistemology of testimony. Testimonies of violence are first-person narratives of violence, therefore unless first-person narratives are recognized and legitimized as philosophically and epistemologically valuable, our knowledge of violence would be seriously compromised. The value of testimonies of violence lies in part in the transmission of truth-claims, but also crucially in the speech-act of giving a testimony. It is the latter that is the focus of this article. I will argue that the act of giving a testimony of violence, being listed to and believed, is essential for the survivor of violence in the process of rebuilding the sense of self and personhood in the aftermath of the violence endured.By looking at the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions worldwide, and highlighting in particular the role of trust within the dynamics of testimonies, I will argue that first-person testimonies of violence are also indispensable for another reason; namely, they prevent acts of violence from turning into instruments of epistemic injustice.Survivors of violence often find themselves being the victims of two forms of violence: apart from enduring the violence being afflicted on them, they also often suffer the epistemic injustice of being marginalized as credible sources of knowledge. Recognizing the validity of testimonies of violence in the form of first-person narratives of violence not only enables us to acquire knowledge of violence, but acknowledging the credibility of the narrator acts as a strong antidote to epistemic injustice.

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reprint Bufacchi, Vittorio (2013) "Knowing Violence: Testimony, Trust and Truth". Revue Internationale de Philosophie 265(3):277-291

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Vittorio Bufacchi
University College Cork

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References found in this work

The role of trust in knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
Critical Notice.Elizabeth Fricker - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):393 - 411.
Testimony, Trust, Knowing.Jonathan Adler - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
It takes two to tango: beyond reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The epistemology of testimony. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 160--89.

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