Mind 129 (513):113-127 (2020)

Authors
David Builes
New York University
Abstract
Our evidence can be about different subject matters. In fact, necessarily equivalent pieces of evidence can be about different subject matters. Does the hyperintensionality of ‘aboutness’ engender any hyperintensionality at the level of rational credence? In this paper, I present a case which seems to suggest that the answer is ‘yes’. In particular, I argue that our intuitive notions of independent evidence and inadmissible evidence are sensitive to aboutness in a hyperintensional way. We are thus left with a paradox. While there is strong reason to think that rational credence cannot make such hyperintensional distinctions, our intuitive judgements about certain cases seem to demand that it does.
Keywords Formal Epistemology  Chance  Infinity  Hyperintensionality  Aboutness
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzz046
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References found in this work BETA

Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Index.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - In Aboutness. Princeton University Press. pp. 219-222.

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Citations of this work BETA

Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2063-2075.
Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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