Noûs (forthcoming)

Authors
David Builes
New York University
Sophie Horowitz
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy-based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise state arbitrarily, however it can be rational to move from an imprecise state to a precise state arbitrarily.
Keywords Imprecise Credences  Accuracy  Formal Epistemology  Chance-Credence Norms
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12338
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.

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