Authors
David Builes
Princeton University
Abstract
My first goal is to motivate a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem of induction. I argue that there is a precise sense in which the only way that orthodox Humean and non-Humean views can justify induction is by appealing to extremely strong and unmotivated probabilistic biases. My second goal is to sketch what such a metaphysical approach could possibly look like. After sketching such an approach, I consider a toy case that illustrates the way in which such a metaphysics can help us make progress on the problem of induction.
Keywords Induction  Laws of Nature  Principle of Indifference  Powerful Qualities
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12753
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lawful Persistence.David Builes & Trevor Teitel - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
Genericity and Inductive Inference.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.

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