The World Just Is the Way It Is

The Monist 104 (1):1-27 (2021)
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Abstract

What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere ‘bundles’ of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that avoids many of the problems inherent in both of these views. The view I will end up defending implies a particularly radical version of Monism, and it collapses the object-property distinction altogether.

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Author's Profile

David Builes
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Identity Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):60-90.
Why Can’T There Be Numbers?David Builes - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Lawful Persistence.David Builes & Trevor Teitel - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
In defense of Countabilism.David Builes & Jessica M. Wilson - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2199-2236.

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References found in this work

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.

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