Ethics 127 (1):116-146 (2016)

Michael Bukoski
Florida State University
Metaethical constitutivists attempt to explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency. Michael Smith has recently defended a novel form of constitutivism that he argues provides a rational foundation for morality. This article develops three main objections centered on (1) the normative significance of Smith’s conception of ideal agency, (2) whether that conception begs the question in favor of the rationality of moral requirements, and (3) whether Smith’s constitutivism provides a plausible account of the content of moral requirements. The conclusion is that Smith’s constitutivism, at least in its present form, is not persuasive.
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DOI 10.1086/687339
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Meeting Constitutivists Halfway.Michael Ridge - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):2951-2968.
The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):542-559.

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