The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):115-129 (2022)

Michael Bukoski
Florida State University
Blackburn’s “quasi-realism” aims to show that expressivism can accommodate the sorts of claims about moral truth, facts, objectivity, and the like that are found in ordinary moral thought and discourse. Egan argues that expressivists cannot accommodate certain claims about the possibility that one’s own fundamental moral commitments are mistaken. He criticizes what I call the approved change strategy, which explains that judgment in terms of the belief that one might change one’s mind as a result of favored processes such as getting more information. Egan targets a simple version of that strategy; I raise objections to a more sophisticated expressivist alternative. I argue against Horgan and Timmons’ claim that quasi-realists need not accommodate certain thoughts about moral fallibility on the grounds that they are metaethical rather than first-order moral claims, and that the implied orientation toward others that results is not objectionably smug. I also argue that the sophisticated strategy problematically commits the expressivist to an ideal observer or advisor theory in first-order ethics.
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-021-09377-z
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The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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