Confirmation and the computational paradigm, or, why do you think they call it artificial intelligence?

Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81 (1993)

Authors
David J. Buller
Northern Illinois University
Abstract
The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that none of these kinds of evidence can be relevant to a choice among competing computational models unless there are in fact type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states. Thus, I conclude, research into the computational procedures employed in human cognition must be conducted hand-in-hand with research into the brain processes which realize those procedures
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Computation  Paradigm  Physicalism  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00975530
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,984
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Shedding Computational Light on Human Creativity.Subrata Dasgupta - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (2):pp. 121-136.
A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
The Quest for Artificial Wisdom.David Casacuberta Sevilla - 2013 - AI and Society 28 (2):199-207.
Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Discovery.Paul Thagard - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:166 - 175.
Emdedded Systems Vs. Individualism.Michael Losonsky - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.
Computational Models in the Philosophy of Science.Paul Thagard - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:329 - 335.
How Molecules Matter to Mental Computation.Paul Thagard - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (3):497-518.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
62 ( #115,494 of 2,319,641 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #149,439 of 2,319,641 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature