The physicist and philosophy

The central thesis of this paper is that physicists have as much to learn from scientifically oriented philosophy as philosophers have to learn from physics. To begin with, any discussion of basic physical ideas and procedures is bound to be conducted in the light of some philosophy or other. Now, the standard philosophy of physics of our century is operationism. And philosophers, with the help of recent developments in semantics, epistemology and the theory of scientific inference, have shown that operationism is untenable. Thus most physicists are dragging a dead philosophy that may not be of any help in conceiving of new ideas and procedures. This, then, is a first contribution philosophy can make to physics, namely to overhaul its philosophy. A second contribution is to the organization of physics, in particular to the axiomatic reconstruction of physical theories and the analysis and validation of empirical procedures. The various theses and antitheses discussed in the article are illustrated with examples taken from contemporary physics
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01801726
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,411
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

25 ( #190,723 of 1,924,732 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #417,761 of 1,924,732 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.