The relations of logic and semantics to ontology

Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (3):195 - 209 (1974)
The author's semantic theory is applied to the problem whether logic and semantics presuppose any ontological theory. it is concluded that, whereas formal logic has no ontological commitments at all, the applications of any theory of reference do presuppose some assumption concerning the furniture of the world, and the very notion of factual truth (as opposed to that of formal truth) presupposes the hypothesis that there exists something external to the factual propositions
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DOI 10.1007/BF00247222
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