An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content
American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129 (2009)
| Authors |
Todd Buras
Baylor University
|
| Abstract |
Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some
mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes.
If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the
precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows
that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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| Keywords | Mental Content Causal Theories of Content Self-representation |
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Citations of this work BETA
Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
A Puzzle About Mental Self-Representation and Causation.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906.
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