American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129 (2009)

Authors
Todd Buras
Baylor University
Abstract
Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
Keywords Mental Content  Causal Theories of Content  Self-representation
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References found in this work BETA

Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Causal Theories of Mental Content.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
What is the Structure of Self-Consciousness and Conscious Mental States?Rocco J. Gennaro - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):295-309.
A Puzzle About Mental Self-Representation and Causation.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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On the Ascription of Content.Stephen P. Stich - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.

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