Cartesian error and the objectivity of perception

In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, And Context. Clarendon Press (1986)

Authors
Tyler Burge
University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Individualism  Minds  Descartes
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The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
What Is the Problem of Perception?Tim Crane - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.
Perception and Content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.

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