Analysis 64 (3):242–250 (2004)

Michael B. Burke
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis
Dion is a full-bodied man. Theon is that part of him which consists of all of him except his left foot. What becomes of Dion and Theon when Dion’s left foot is amputated? In Burke 1994, employing the doctrine of sortal essentialism, I defended a surprising position last defended by Chrysippus: that Dion survives while the seemingly unscathed Theon perishes. This paper defends that position against objections by Stone, Carter, Olson, and others. Most notably, it offers a novel, conservative solution to the many-thinkers problem, a solution that enables us to accept the existence of brain-containing person-parts while denying that those person-parts are thinking, conscious beings.
Keywords many-thinkers problem  problem of the many  material constitution
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DOI 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00492.x
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References found in this work BETA

Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press UK.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Four-Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Objects and Persons.T. Sider - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):195-198.

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Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Theistic Modal Realism II: Theoretical Benefits.Michael Almeida - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12418.

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