Learning to listen: Epistemic injustice and the child

Episteme 13 (3):359-377 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In Epistemic Injustice Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. Fricker's examples of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to testimonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserve. To illustrate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against children we document examples of negative prejudicial treatment in forensic contexts where children frequently act as testifiers. These examples, along with research on the child's competence and reliability as a testifier, reveal widespread epistemic prejudice against children. Given that subjection to prejudice can have a detrimental impact on children we discuss ways to ameliorate this form of testimonial injustice. We argue that, both in formal and natural contexts, the child's testimony should be evaluated alongside the relationships that support her development as a testifier. The adult can play a central role in creating successful testimonial interactions with children by acting as a.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,330

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice.Laura Beeby - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
Epistemic Injustice and Religion.Ian James Kidd - 2017 - In Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Gaile Pohlhaus (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge. pp. 386-396.
Listening-as-Usual: A Response to Michael Hand.Karin Murris - 2015 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 34 (3):331-335.
What Do Kids Know? A Response to Karin Murris.Michael Hand - 2015 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 34 (3):327-330.
Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice.Katherine Hawley - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 283-99.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.
Epistemic Injustice The Third Way?S. E. Marshall - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):174-177.


Added to PP

170 (#102,504)

6 months
24 (#95,999)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Deborah Tollefsen
University of Memphis
Michael Burroughs
California State University, Bakersfield

References found in this work

Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
Testimony.Arindam Chakrabarti - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):965-972.
The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice.Karin Murris - 2013 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 32 (3):245-259.
The nature of testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):177–197.

View all 7 references / Add more references