Mind-body causation and explanatory practice

In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press (1995)
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Abstract

Argument for Epiphenomenalism [I]: (A) Mental event-tokens are identical with physical event-tokens. (B) The causal powers of a physical event are determined only by its physical properties; and (C) mental properties are not reducible to physical properties

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Tyler Burge
University of California, Los Angeles

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