‘Ontological’ arguments from experience: Daniel A. Dombrowski, Iris Murdoch, and the nature of divine reality

Religious Studies 49 (4):459-480 (2013)

Authors
Elizabeth Denise Burns
University of London
Abstract
Dombrowski and Murdoch offer versions of the ontological argument which aim to avoid two types of objection – those concerned with the nature of the divine, and those concerned with the move from an abstract concept to a mind-independent reality. For both, the nature of the concept of God/Good entails its instantiation, and both supply a supporting argument from experience. It is only Murdoch who successfully negotiates the transition from an abstract concept to the instantiation of that concept, however, and this is achieved by means of an ontological argument from moral experience which, in a reversal of the Kantian doctrine, depends ultimately on a form of the cosmological argument.
Keywords ontological argument  Iris Murdoch  Daniel Dombrowski
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DOI 10.1017/s0034412512000340
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References found in this work BETA

Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.D. W. Hamlyn & Charles Taylor - 1991 - British Journal of Educational Studies 39 (1):101.
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals.Iris Murdoch & Peter J. Conradi - 2001 - Journal of Religious Ethics 29 (2):307-335.
The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1971 - Religious Studies 8 (2):180-181.

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