Quine, analyticity and philosophy of mathematics

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55 (2004)
Abstract
Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, even if fully accepted, still leave room for a notion of pragmatic analyticity sufficient for the indicated purpose
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00341.x
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References found in this work BETA
In Defense of a Dogma.H. Paul Grice & P. F. Strawson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophical Review. Routledge. pp. 141 - 158.
In Defense of a Dogma.H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson - 1956 - Philosophical Review 65 (2):141-158.
On Carnap's Views on Ontology.W. V. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (5):65--72.

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Citations of this work BETA
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