Abstract

This thesis was a critique of Hegel from a Heideggerian standpoint focusing on the role of action in community. It argues, first, that Heidegger has a more highly developed account of the present of action than does Hegel on account of his theory of temporality. On the basis of a discussion of the nature of action and its site, I examine the way in which action functions in community in both Hegel and Heidegger. For Hegel, action is essential to community; intersubjective relations and mutual recognition depend upon it. For Heidegger, it is precisely the non-acting moment, the moment of vision (Augenblick), which forms the basis for community. Community, for Heidegger, would thus be prior to action, issuing from a place proper to Dasein which precedes all action in the world. I argue that the existence of a moment, the moment of vision, which would initially seem to refuse community in Heidegger actually provides a rich sense of the intersubjective because it allows for the experience of that which is totally Other. On the basis of this experience, Dasein -- the being that each and every one of us is -- would thus be capable of recognizing the essential alienness of the everyday communal world to it. Dasein would thus be able to recognize its difference and thus the difference of others from how their actions are taken up in the communal sphere. Action would thus not be the basis for community. For Hegel, action is essential to mutual recognition, which is the fabric of community. The radical otherness that is found in Heidegger when he articulates the authentic moment would be dismissed by Hegel as an affront to the possibility of community (Hegel’s beautiful soul). For Hegel, we are what we do and we are recognized exclusively on the basis of our actions. Consequently, I argue that Heidegger has a deeper and more radical sense of community than Hegel. This dissertation was inspired by the work of Maurice Blanchot.