Foundations of Science 10 (2):153-245 (2005)
The ancient dualism of a sensible and an intelligible world important in Neoplatonic and medieval philosophy, down to Descartes and Kant, would seem to be supplanted today by a scientific view of mind-in-nature. Here, we revive the old dualism in a modified form, and describe mind as a symbolic language, founded in linguistic recursive computation according to the Church-Turing thesis, constituting a world L that serves the human organism as a map of the Universe U. This methodological distinction of L vs. U helps to understand how and why structures of phenomena come to be opposed to their nature in human thought, a central topic in Heideggerian philosophy. U is uncountable according to Georg Cantor’s set theory but Language L, based on the recursive function system, is countable, and anchored in a Gray Area within U of observable phenomena, typically symbols, prelinguistic structures, genetic-historical records of their origins. Symbols, the phenomena most familiar to mathematicians, are capable of being addressed in L-processing. The Gray Area is the human Environment E, where we can live comfortably, that we manipulate to create our niche within hostile U, with L offering overall competence of the species to survive. The human being is seen in the light of his or her linguistic recursively computational mind. Nature U, by contrast, is the unfathomable abyss of being, infinite labyrinth of darkness, impenetrable and hostile to man. The U-man, biological organism, is a stranger in L-man, the mind-controlled rational person, as expounded by Saint Paul. Noumena can now be seen to reside in L, and are not fully supported by phenomena. Kant’s noumenal cause is the mental L-image of only partly phenomenal causation. Mathematics occurs naturally in pre-linguistic phenomena, including natural laws, which give rise to pure mathematical structures in the world of L. Mathematical foundation within philosophy is reversed to where natural mathematics in the Gray Area of pre-linguistic phenomena can be seen to be a prerequisite for intellectual discourse. Lesser, nonverbal versions of L based on images are shared with animals.
|Keywords||Mind-in-Nature Language Systems recursive functions Church-Turing thesis pre-linguistic structures phenomenal and transcendental uses of language|
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The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.Karl R. Popper & John C. Eccles - 1977 - Springer.
Philosophy in the Flesh the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought.George Lakoff - 1999 - Basic Books.
Where Mathematics Comes From How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being.George Lakoff & Rafael E. Núñez - 2000
Citations of this work BETA
The Cognitive Gap, Neural Darwinism & Linguistic Dualism —Russell, Husserl, Heidegger & Quine.Hermann G. W. Burchard - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):244-264.
The Role of Conscious Attention in Perception.Hermann Burchard - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (1):67-99.
Philosophy and Science, the Darwinian-Evolved Computational Brain, a Non-Recursive Super-Turing Machine & Our Inner-World-Producing Organ.Hermann G. W. Burchard - 2016 - Open Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):13-28.
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