Underdetermination and rational choice of theories

Philosophia 37 (1):55-65 (2009)
Abstract
The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists are reasonable in expecting one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for theory choice.
Keywords Theory choice  Constructive empiricism  Underdetermination of theory by data  Inference to the best explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9133-9
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,188
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Empirical Stance.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.
Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination.Larry Laudan & Jarrett Leplin - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):449-472.
Studies in Scientific Realism.André Kukla - 1998 - Oxford University Press.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Truth May Not Explain Predictive Success, but Truthlikeness Does.Gustavo Cevolani & Luca Tambolo - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):590-593.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Background Theories and Total Science.P. D. Magnus - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1064-1075.
Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Distinction.Samir Okasha - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):303-319.
Epistemic Equivalence and Epistemic Incapacitation.D. Tulodziecki - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):313-328.
The Miraculous Choice Argument for Realism.E. C. Barnes - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (2):97 - 120.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

200 ( #19,853 of 2,153,830 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #119,783 of 2,153,830 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums