Bell's theorem: What it takes

I compare deterministic and stochastic hidden variable models of the Bell experiment, exphasising philosophical distinctions between the various ways of combining conditionals and probabilities. I make four main claims. (1) Under natural assumptions, locality as it occurs in these models is equivalent to causal independence, as analysed (in the spirit of Lewis) in terms of probabilities and conditionals. (2) Stochastic models are indeed more general than deterministic ones. (3) For factorizable stochastic models, relativity's lack of superluminal causation does not favour locality over completeness. (4) If we prohibit all superluminal causation, then the violation of the Bell inequality teaches us a lesson, besides quantum mechanics' familiar ones that quantities can lack precise values and that pairs of quantities can lack joint probabilities: namely, some pairs of events are not screened off by their common past.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/43.1.41
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J. Berkovitz (1995). What Econometrics Cannot Teach Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):163-200.
Brandon Fogel (2007). Formalizing the Separability Condition in Bell's Theorem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (4):920-937.

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