Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):321-33 (1993)

This paper discusses the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. Chalmers (1990, 1993) argues that a connectionist implementation of a classical cognitive architecture possesses a compositional semantics, and therefore undercuts Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) argument that connectionist networks cannot possess a compositional semantics. I argue that Chalmers argument misconstrues the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. This paper clarifies the distinction, and shows that while Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument survives Chalmers' critique, it cannot be used to establish the irrelevance of neurophysiological implementation to cognitive modeling; some aspects of Chater and Oaksford's (1990) response to Fodor and Pylyshyn, though not all, are therefore cogent
Keywords Cognitivism  Compositionality  Connectionism  Epistemology  Chalmers, A  Fodor, J  Pylyshyn, Z
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089308573095
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,265
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
34 ( #335,323 of 2,507,714 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,820 of 2,507,714 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes