Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37 (1996)

A great deal of philosophical work has addressed the question of whether Man’s computational theory of early vision is individualistic. Burge and Davies have argued that, according to Marr’s theory, visual states are individuated non-individualistically. Segal has denied that Marr’s theory has these non-individualistic implications. More recently, Shapiro has argued that the entire debate has been misguided. I argue that Shapiro is mistaken in a fairly deep way, attention to which allows us to raise and clarify several important issues involved in discussions of individualism. Contrary to Burge and Davies, and by a route rather different from Segal’s, I defend the claim that Man’s theory offers no reason to think that visual states are individuated non-individualistically.
Keywords Computation  Epistemology  Individualism  Linguistics  Vision  Marr, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00050.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,959
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Individualism and Psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Externalism About Mental Content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Individualism, Twin Scenarios and Visual Content.M. J. Cain - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
71 ( #161,809 of 2,504,833 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,030 of 2,504,833 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes