Is goal ascription possible in minimal mindreading?

Psychological Review 123 (2):228-233 (2016)
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Abstract

In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.

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